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Abstract
One of the primary challenges to measuring the impact of antitrust or com-
petition policy on collusion is that the cartel population is unobservable; we
observe only the population of discovered cartels. To address this challenge, a
model of cartel creation and dissolution is developed to endogenously derive the
populations of cartels and discovered cartels. With this theory, one can infer
the impact of competition policy on the population of cartels by measuring its
impact on the population of discovered cartels. In particular, changes in the du-
ration of discovered cartels can be informative in assessing whether a new policy
is reducing the latent rate of cartels.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, numerous developments in antitrust and competition policy have oc-
curred to fight cartels. In the European Union, many member countries have adopted
more rigorous enforcement. In 1998, the European Commission published guidelines
for the determination of corporate fines for price fixing which were then revised in
2006.1 In December 2005, the European Commission issued a green paper on the
issue of using customer damages as a penalty, which is now a topic under intense
discussion. On the other side of the Atlantic, the Antitrust Division of the U.S.
Department of Justice has also adopted new policies. The revision of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines in 1991 allowed for significantly higher fines.2 With the An-
titrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004, the statutory limit on
corporate penalty was raised from $10 million to $100 million. And perhaps the most
significant policy innovation was the 1993 revision of the Corporate Leniency Pro-
gram.3 Its apparent success led the European Commission to adopt its own program
in 1996, which was then substantively revised in 2002.
With all of these policy changes - new guidelines for penalties, more aggressive
enforcement, leniency programs - it is natural to ask: What eﬀect have they had?
The fundamental obstacle to addressing this question is that we do not observe the
population of cartels. Due to their illegality, cartels hide themselves; we observe only
the population of discovered cartels. To see the diﬃculties that can arise, consider a
policy that impacts both the rate of cartel formation and the rate at which cartels are
discovered. By both raising the discovery rate and reducing the number of cartels,
the eﬀect on the number of convictions is generally ambiguous. Hence, the number
of convictions could be unchanged even though the policy is working as intended.
Alternatively, the lack of change in the number of convictions could reflect the inef-
fectiveness of the new policy. How are we to judge the eﬃcacy of a policy when the
intended variable to be aﬀected - the cartel rate - is not observed?
The approach of this paper is to develop a model that endogenizes the population
of cartels and the population of discovered cartels and then identifies how these two
populations are related. What observable change in the population of discovered
cartels is informative as to what is happening with the frequency of cartels? To
address this question, a population of heterogeneous industries is considered and
the birth and death process for cartels is modelled. Industries are given stochastic
opportunities to form a cartel and do so if it is incentive compatible. Because of
random market conditions, a cartel may persist or perish because it is no longer
incentive compatible to collude; they may also be discovered by the antitrust or
competition authorities. Cartel formation and demise is then a stochastic process
and we characterize its stationary distribution to derive a rate of cartelization for
this population of industries.
Policy changes are considered that impact the probability of detection and convic-
1See Wils (2006) for an analysis.
2For a recent discussion of fines set by the U.S. Department of Justice, see Connor (2007).
3For a survey on leniency programs and how this work fits into the broader literature on enforce-
ment, see Spagnolo (2008).
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tion - such as the budget of the competition authority - and also those that influence
the size of penalties.4 For some policy changes, we find that observing the change in
the number of discovered cartels is an eﬀective proxy for the change in the number of
cartels. For other policy changes, it is not. In the latter case, a useful proxy proves
to be the change in the duration of discovered cartels. In particular, if discovered
cartels tend to be longer in duration after a policy change then the policy change is
probably reducing cartel formation. The intuition is quite simple. If the new policy
is more eﬃcacious then its adoption will immediately cause the marginally stable
cartels to collapse which, by virtue of being marginally stable, tend to be of rela-
tively short duration. Their exit from the cartel population means they cannot be
discovered (though all that is necessary for the result is that the likelihood of them
being discovered is reduced by virtue of their exit). It follows that the surviving
cartels are those which tend to be more stable and thus of longer duration. Since it is
those cartels which make up the pool from which cartels are discovered, the average
duration of discovered cartels rises in the short-run in response to a more eﬀective
competition policy.
Though this project is focused on providing methods for evaluating policies de-
signed to fight cartels, it makes a broader contribution to the general theoretical
literature on collusion by modelling the birth and death process of cartels. Despite
its immensity and richness, the theory of collusion focuses on a single industry in
describing what conditions are conducive to collusion and what types of patterns in
prices and quantities are associated with collusion. Though there is some work that
endogenizes cartel formation - such as Selten (1973) - this research has not mod-
elled the birth and death of cartels and thus cannot address the questions motivating
this study. This paper shows how one can model the stochastic process determining
the population of cartels and use it to generate a rate of cartelization for an econ-
omy. Independently, Miller (2007) has specified and explored an exogenous stochastic
process for cartels though cartel formation and dissolution is not endogenized as in
the current paper.
Finally, it is worth noting that the measurement problem motivating this paper
is not unique to price-fixing; it arises as well for other forms of criminal activity
including tax evasion, extortion, blackmail, and kidnapping. These types of crimes
are common in that they are often not reported; either because the victim doesn’t
know they are being victimized (such as with price-fixing and tax evasion) or the
victim doesn’t have an incentive to report (due to the threat of some punishment).
This creates the challenge of measuring the rate of criminal activity and assessing the
impact of a policy on the crime rate. One approach to measuring the crime rate is
to engage in random sampling. While that may work with tax evasion, it would be
diﬃcult to randomly sample industries for collusion or small businesses for extortion.
There is then a fundamental challenge in measuring the latent rate of criminal activity
with data based on non-random sampling.
After reviewing the model in Section 2, the cartel formation decision is character-
4We also briefly describe some results - available on request - regarding the institution of a leniency
program which impacts both the probability of paying penalties and the amount of penalties.
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ized in Section 3. Aggregating cartel creation and dissolution across a heterogeneous
pool of industries, the stationary distribution on cartels is constructed in Section 4.
The main results are in Section 5.
2 Model
The objective is to construct a model in which some industries collude and some do
not, some cartels collapse and some do not, some cartels are caught and some are not.
As we are going to consider a population of industries, the model of each industry is
kept simple by using a Prisoners’ Dilemma formulation. For each industry, there is a
stochastic realization of a market’s profitability that is summarized by the variable
π ≥ 0. If firms are colluding then each firm earns π and, if not colluding, then each
earns απ where α ∈ [0, 1) . π has a continuously diﬀerentiable cdf H : [π, π] → [0, 1]
where 0 < π < π and π may be finite or infinite. h (·) denotes the associated density
function. Let μ ≡
R
πh (π) dπ denote its finite mean. As in Rotemberg and Saloner
(1986), π is observed prior to firms deciding how to behave. If all other firms are
colluding, the profit a firm earns by deviating is ηπ where η > 1. Let δ ∈ (0, 1) denote
the common discount factor. Note that the Bertrand price game is represented by
(α, η) = (0, n) where n is the number of firms. The Cournot quantity game with
linear demand and cost functions in which firms collude at the joint profit maximum
can be represented as (α, η) =
³
4n
(n+1)2
, (n+1)
2
4n
´
.
At the start of each period, an industry is either cartelized or not. If it was
cartelized at the end of the previous period then it is currently cartelized. If it was
not cartelized at the end of the previous period then with probability κ ∈ (0, 1) it has
an opportunity to do so.5 Given the realization of π, if firms either are not cartelized
or if collusion is not incentive compatible then each firm earns απ. If there is a cartel
and collusion is incentive compatible then each earns π.
At the end of the period, there is the random event whereby the competition
authority may pursue an investigation; this can only occur if firms colluded in the
current or previous period.6 Let σ ∈ [0, 1) denote the probability that firms are
discovered and convicted. In that case, each firm incurs a penalty of F1−δ (so that F
is the per-period penalty). For reasons of tractability, the standard assumption in
repeated game models with a competition authority is that the penalty is fixed and
thus independent of the severity of the oﬀense.7 Given there is only one collusive
price in our model, severity necessarily refers to the number of periods that firms
5That κ < 1 may be because cartelization requires having a set of managers willing to break the
law or that feel they can communicate and trust each other or an opportunity arises to communicate
without much risk of being caught.
6 It is natural to suppose that the likelihood of being caught declines with the length of time since
firms colluded. For example, discovery may be due to suspicions of uninvolved employees but they
are less likely to become suspicious as the flow of fresh evidence is cut oﬀ due to the cartel no longer
operating. Having the decay occur immediately after one period is a simplification that improves
tractability since otherwise it would require introducing a state variable which is the time at which
firms last colluded.
7For a review of some of this work, see Spagnolo (2008).
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colluded. Allowing the penalty to depend on severity would then mean having, for
each cartel, a state variable which is the length of time of collusion. The introduction
of that state variable would be a serious complication of the model and suggests why,
in previous models, the penalty is instead assumed fixed. We have, however, found a
tractable specification that allows the penalty to depend on the average severity: The
penalty is assumed to be proportional to the average increase in profit from being
cartelized (rather than the realized increase in profit). If Y denotes the average per
period profit from being in the "cartel state" then F = γ (Y − αμ) where γ > 0. This
specification avoids the introduction of a state variable but still allows the penalty
to be sensitive to the (average) extent of collusion. In sum, the competition policy
parameters are (σ, γ) which are, respectively, the probability of paying penalties and
the penalty multiple.
Whenever a cartel is shutdown - whether due to internal collapse or having been
successfully prosecuted - the industry may re-cartelize in the future. Specifically, it
has an opportunity to do so with probability κ in each period that it is not currently
colluding. Alternatively, one could imagine having two distinct probabilities - one
to reconstitute collusion after a firm cheated (the probability of moving from the
punishment to the cooperative phase) and another to reform the cartel after having
been convicted. For purposes of parsimony and tractability, those two probabilities
are assumed to be the same; we have no reason to think that results are sensitive to
this assumption.
The modelling of collusion here diﬀers from how it is typically done. The standard
approach presumes that firms are always coordinating; even when they are compet-
ing, it is a coordinated punishment in response to suspected cheating. In a perfect
monitoring setting such as Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), it may require adjusting
the collusive price so as to maintain cartel stability. Or, in an imperfect monitoring
setting, it may require periodic shifts to distinctly lower prices. But, at all times,
firms are coordinating their behavior. We do not believe that is always a reasonable
representation of reality. There are many well-documented episodes in which a car-
tel truly collapses in the sense that coordination stops and what emerges from the
ashes is competition. Of course, coordination may start up again but it need not be
immediate and the prospect of it re-starting may be reasonably viewed as uncertain
from the perspective of firms.
In modelling a population of industries, it is compelling to allow industries to
vary in terms of cartel stability. For this purpose, industries are assumed to diﬀer in
terms of the parameter η. If one takes this assumption literally, it can be motivated
by heterogeneity in the elasticity of firm demand or the number of firms (as with the
Bertrand price game). Our intent is not to be literal but rather to think of this as
a parsimonious way in which to encompass industry heterogeneity. Let the cdf on
industry types be represented by the continuously diﬀerentiable function G :
£
η, η
¤
→
[0, 1] where 1 < η < η. g (·) denotes the associated density function. The appeal of
having heterogeneity with respect to η is that it is a parameter which influences the
frequency of collusion but does not directly aﬀect the value of the firm’s profit stream
since, in equilibrium, firms do not cheat; this makes for an easier analysis. In Section
5
5.3, we discuss the robustness of our results with respect to other forms of industry
heterogeneity.
3 Equilibrium Cartel Formation
Characterization of the stationary distribution on cartels is a three-step procedure.
First, the equilibrium conditions for a cartel to be stable in a type-η industry are
characterized in this section. This result is then used in the ensuing section where the
stationary distribution on the sub-population of type-η industries is first characterized
and then that result is integrated over all values of η to derive the aggregate stationary
distribution.
3.1 Existence of an Equilibrium
A collusive strategy for a type-η industry entails colluding when π is suﬃciently
low and not colluding otherwise. The logic is as in Rotemberg and Saloner (1986).
When π is high, the incentive to deviate is strong since a firm increases current
profit by (η − 1)π. Given π is iid then the future payoﬀ is independent of the current
realization of π. Since the payoﬀ to cheating is increasing in π while the future payoﬀ
is independent of π, the incentive compatibility of collusion is more problematic when
π is higher. Depending on the parameter values, it is possible that collusion is not
incentive compatible for any π ∈ [π, π] , in which case those industries never cartelize.
Similarly, it may be the case that collusion is incentive compatible for all π ∈ [π, π] ,
in which case such cartels are never subject to internal collapse and are only shut
down by the authorities.
Suppose firms are able to collude for at least some realizations of π. Let W o and
Y o denote the payoﬀ when the industry is not cartelized and is cartelized, respectively.
If not cartelized then, with probability κ, firms have an opportunity to cartelize with
resulting payoﬀ Y o. With probability 1 − κ, firms do not have such an opportunity
and continue to compete. In that case, each firm earns current expected profit of αμ
and a future value of W o. Thus, the payoﬀ when not colluding is defined recursively
by:
W o = (1− κ) (αμ+ δW o) + κY o. (1)
It’ll be easier to work with re-scaled payoﬀs, so define:
W ≡ (1− δ)W o, Y ≡ (1− δ)Y o
Multiplying both sides of (1) by 1− δ and re-arranging yields:
W = (1− κ) [(1− δ)αμ+ δW ] + κY ⇔
W =
(1− κ) (1− δ)αμ+ κY
1− δ (1− κ) (2)
Also note that the incremental value to being in the cartelized state is:
Y −W = Y −
µ
(1− κ) (1− δ)αμ− κY
1− δ (1− κ)
¶
=
(1− κ) (1− δ) (Y − αμ)
1− δ (1− κ) . (3)
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Suppose firms are cartelized and π is realized. The incentive compatibility con-
straint (ICC) is:
(1− δ)π + δ [(1− σ)Y + σ (W − F )] ≥ (1− δ) ηπ + δ (W − σF )⇔
δ (1− σ) (Y −W ) ≥ (1− δ) (η − 1)π ⇔
π ≤ δ (1− σ) (Y −W )
(1− δ) (η − 1) (≡ φ (Y, η)) . (4)
Collusion is stable when the profit realization is suﬃciently low. Given all other firms
collude, a firm earns π by also colluding and has an expected continuation payoﬀ of
(1− σ)Y + σ (W − F ) since with probability σ it is caught and convicted in which
case the industry shifts to the non-cartel state and each firm pays a penalty of F.8
Note that the expected penalty does not impact the ICC because it is unaﬀected
by whether a firm cheats or colludes. The presumption is that discovery depends
only on whether firms attempted to coordinate this period and not on whether such
coordination was successful (that is, a firm doesn’t believe its act of cheating alters the
likelihood of paying penalties in the current period). This is clearly a simplification
and indeed there have been analyses modelling how the realized price path influences
the likelihood of detection and feeds back to impact the optimal cartel price path
(Harrington, 2004, 2005; Harrington and Chen, 2006).
The expected (rescaled) payoﬀ to being cartelized can now be recursively defined.
Given an industry is cartelized and given a profit realization π ≤ φ (Y, η), each firm
earns profit of π and the cartel is caught with probability σ in which case each receives
the future non-collusive payoﬀW less the penalty F ; and if not caught each earns the
future collusive value Y . If instead φ (Y, η) < π then the cartel collapses so each firm
earns απ and the future value is W less expected penalties.9 The following equation
then defines the implied collusive value, ψ (Y ), when firms perceive it to be Y .
ψ (Y ) =
Z δ(1−σ)(Y−W )
(1−δ)(η−1)
π
[(1− δ)π + δY − δσ (Y −W )]h (π) dπ (5)
+
Z π
δ(1−σ)(Y−W )
(1−δ)(η−1)
[(1− δ)απ + δW ]h (π) dπ − δσF.
To derive an expression in only one unknown, Y, substitute for (Y −W ) using (3)
and for W using (2). Also, replace F with γ (Y − αμ) .
(6)
ψ (Y ) =
Z δ(1−σ)(1−κ)(Y−αμ)
[1−δ(1−κ)](η−1)
π
∙
(1− δ)π + δY −
µ
δσ (1− κ) (1− δ) (Y − αμ)
1− δ (1− κ)
¶¸
h (π) dπ
+
Z π
δ(1−σ)(1−κ)(Y−αμ)
[1−δ(1−κ)](η−1)
∙
(1− δ)απ + δ
µ
(1− κ) (1− δ)αμ+ κY
1− δ (1− κ)
¶¸
h (π) dπ − δσγ (Y − αμ) .
8We will later substitute γ (Y − αμ) for F .
9One might expect the probability of being caught to be lower if firms are not currently colluding
(though did collude in the previous period). This we consider a reasonable approximation in that
the diﬀerence in probability is likely to be small and making this assumption simplifies the analysis.
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A fixed point to ψ is an equilibrium value for Y. That is, given an anticipated
collusive value Y, the resulting equilibrium behavior results in that same value when
firms are cartelized.
As an initial step to exploring the set of fixed points, first note that ψ (αμ) =
αμ. Hence, one fixed point to ψ is the degenerate solution without collusion. It is
straightforward to show ψ (μ) ≤ μ and, if σ > 0 and γ > 0, then ψ (μ) < μ. The
issue is whether there is another fixed point - in which case Y > αμ - and thus firms
are cartelizing with positive probability. Towards establishing when that is the case,
Theorem 1 will prove useful. Proofs are in the appendix.
Theorem 1 If κ1−δ(1−κ) > σγ then: i) ψ : [αμ, μ] → [αμ, μ] ; ii) ψ
0 (Y ) ≥ 0, ∀Y ∈
[αμ, μ) ; and iii) if φ (Y, η) ∈ (π, π) then ψ0 (Y ) > 0.
Thus, if the probability of discovery and conviction, σ, and/or the penalty mul-
tiple, γ, are suﬃciently low then ψ continuously maps [αμ, μ] into itself and is an
increasing function of Y. From hereon, assume:
κ
1− δ (1− κ) > σγ.
Define Y ∗ to be the maximal fixed point of ψ:
Y ∗ (η) ≡ max {Y ∈ [αμ, μ] : ψ (Y ; η) = Y } . (7)
A collusive solution is said to exist when Y ∗ > αμ. The next result shows that,
when the probability of having to pay penalties is suﬃciently low, a cartel forms with
positive probability when η is suﬃciently low. Otherwise, a cartel never forms.
Theorem 2 If σ is suﬃciently close to zero then ∃bη > 1, such that
Y ∗ (η)
½
∈ (αμ, μ] if η ∈ (1,bη]
= αμ if η > bη
From hereon, assume σ is suﬃciently low and η is suﬃciently close to one so that
a cartel forms for suﬃciently low values of η (that is, bη > η) and, in addition, does
not form for suﬃciently high values of η (that is, η is suﬃciently high so that bη < η).
If there are multiple interior solutions to (6), we make the usual selection that
firms achieve the equilibrium with the highest value, which is Y ∗ (η) . Given Y ∗ (η) ,
define φ∗ (η) as the maximum profit realization such that the cartel is stable:
φ∗ (η) ≡ δ (1− σ) (1− κ) [Y
∗ (η)− αμ]
[1− δ (1− κ)] (η − 1) . (8)
φ∗ (η) is a measure of cartel stability since the cartel is stable iﬀ π ≤ φ∗ (η) . This can
be seen more clearly by noting that the probability a cartel survives in any period is
(1− σ)H (φ∗ (η)) which is non-decreasing in φ∗ (η) .
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3.2 Comparative Statics
Theorem 3 provides some intuitive comparative statics regarding the value to carteliz-
ing, Y ∗ (η), and the measure of cartel stability, φ∗ (η).
Theorem 3 Y ∗ (η) is non-increasing in σ, γ, and η. If Y ∗ (η) ∈ (αμ, μ) then Y ∗ (η)
is decreasing in σ and γ. If φ∗ (η) ∈ (π, π) then Y ∗ (η) is decreasing in η and φ∗ (η)
is decreasing in σ, γ, η, and α.
When competition policy is made tougher - as reflected in a higher value for σ or γ
- the value to forming a cartel, Y ∗ (η) , is reduced. There is both a direct eﬀect and an
indirect eﬀect underlying this result. The direct eﬀect is that the expected penalty is
higher - by making conviction more likely or increasing the penalty multiple - and this
lowers the collusive value, holding firm behavior fixed. This higher expected penalty
induces an indirect (behavioral) eﬀect as it reduces the range of profit realizations
for which the cartel is stable (that is, φ∗ (η) is decreasing in σ and γ). Therefore,
firms expect a shorter duration from forming a cartel and this also serves to reduce
the collusive value. Hence, both the direct and indirect eﬀects work to reduce the
value to being cartelized and the stability of the cartel. With regards to the eﬀect
of the industry type η, only the indirect eﬀect is operative. There is a greater payoﬀ
to cheating for an industry with a higher value for η and this translates into a less
stable cartel and a lower value to being cartelized. A final parameter of interest is the
non-collusive profit rate which is controlled by α. As α rises, the expected incremental
profit from colluding, (1− α)μ, is reduced, and the cartel is made less stable since the
punishment from cheating declines. A higher value for α then weakens the incentive
to form a cartel and reduces cartel stability.10
Recall from Theorem 2 that if η is suﬃciently high then an industry will not
cartelize for any profit state; only industries for which η ≤ bη can potentially cartelize.
The next result shows that when competition policy is tougher or the non-collusive
profit is higher, there is a smaller set of industries that are able to cartelize. The
intuition is the same as with Theorem 3.
Theorem 4 bη is decreasing in σ, γ, and α.
4 Stationary Distribution on Cartels
Using the preceding analysis, the stochastic process by which cartels are born and die
(either through internal collapse or being caught) is characterized in this section. The
random events driving this process are: i) the opportunity to cartelize; ii) the profit
conditions; and iii) detection by the competition authority. We initially characterize
10The collusive value can be shown to be increasing in the non-collusive profit rate (which is
controlled by α) but that is not very informative because the collusive value is also based on periods
during which firms earn the non-collusive profit. More informative is that the incremental expected
gain from colluding, Y ∗ (η;α)−αμ, can be shown to be decreasing in α. It is the latter property that
results in φ∗ (η;α) being decreasing in α.
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the stationary distribution for the subset of type-η industries. The stationary distri-
bution for the entire population of industries is then characterized by integrating the
distributions for the type-η industries.
Section 3 characterized behavior for a specific industry. There it was shown that
if a type-η industry was not cartelized at the end of the previous period then it’ll
cartelize and collude in the current period with probability κH (φ∗ (η)). If a type-η
industry was cartelized at the end of the previous period then it’ll still be cartelized
at the end of this period with probability (1− σ)H (φ∗ (η)). Suppose there is a
continuum of type-η industries with independent realizations of the stochastic events
each period. The task is to characterize the stationary distribution with regards to
the frequency and duration of cartels.
Let β (l; η) denote the proportion of type-η industries with cartels of length l ∈
{0, 1, 2, . . .} . l = 0 means firms are not cartelized so that 1− β (0; η) is the fraction
of cartels among type-η industries. To reduce the notational burden, η will often be
suppressed. The stationary distribution is defined by the following set of equations:
β (0; η) = β (0; η) [(1− κ) + κ (1−H (φ∗)) + κσH (φ∗)] (9)
+[1− β (0; η)] [(1−H (φ∗)) + σH (φ∗)]
β (1; η) = β (0; η)κ (1− σ)H (φ∗) (10)
β (l; η) = β (l − 1; η) (1− σ)H (φ∗) , l ∈ {2, 3, . . .} (11)
Note that η enters through φ∗. Considering the rhs of (9), a fraction β (0; η) of type-
η industries were not cartelized in the previous period. Out of those industries, a
fraction 1− κ will not have the opportunity to cartelize and thus will not collude in
the current period. A fraction κ (1−H (φ∗)) will have the opportunity but, due to a
high profit realization, find it is not incentive compatible to collude, while a fraction
κσH (φ∗) will cartelize but then are discovered by the authorities. Of the industries
that were colluding in the previous period, which have mass 1 − β (0; η), a fraction
1 − H (φ∗) will collapse for internal reasons and a fraction σH (φ∗) will instead be
caught by the authorities and thus shutdown. Turning to (10), an industry can go
from competing to colluding by being presented with the opportunity to cartelize,
which occurs with probability κ, and having a suﬃciently low profit realization, which
occurs with probabilityH (φ∗) . Finally, an existing cartel continues to collude - which
means if it is of length l − 1 then its length grows to l - if the profit realization is
suﬃciently low and it is not discovered and convicted; the joint probability of that
event is (1− σ)H (φ∗) which gives us (11).
Solving (9) for β (0; η):
β (0; η) =
1− (1− σ)H (φ∗)
1− (1− κ) (1− σ)H (φ∗) . (12)
In the steady-state, the fraction of cartels among type-η industries is then:
1− β (0; η) = κ (1− σ)H (φ
∗)
1− (1− κ) (1− σ)H (φ∗) . (13)
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Next note that:
β (l; η) = β (0; η)κ [H (φ) (1− σ)]l , l ≥ 1. (14)
A mass β (0; η)κ of industries get the chance to form a cartel and a fraction of
[H (φ) (1− σ)]l will still be cartelized l periods later. Using (12), we can substitute
for β (0; η) in (14):
β (l; η) =
[1− (1− σ)H (φ∗)]κ [H (φ∗) (1− σ)]l
1− (1− κ) (1− σ)H (φ∗) , l ≥ 1.
Next define the probability distribution over cartel length among cartels, {f (l; η)}∞l=1 .
f (l; η) ≡ β (l; η)
1− β (0; η) , l ≥ 1
=
Ã
[1− (1− σ)H (φ∗)]κ [H (φ∗) (1− σ)]l
1− (1− κ) (1− σ)H (φ∗)
!µ
κ (1− σ)H (φ∗)
1− (1− κ) (1− σ)H (φ∗)
¶−1
= [1− (1− σ)H (φ∗)] [(1− σ)H (φ∗)]l−1
= [(1− σ)H (φ∗)]l−1 − [(1− σ)H (φ∗)]l
The average cartel length is then:
∞X
l=1
lf (l; η) =
1
1− (1− σ)H (φ∗) .
Finally, the derivation of the entire population of industries is performed by in-
tegrating the type-η distribution over types, η ∈
£
η, η
¤
.
neβ (l)o∞
l=0
denotes the sta-
tionary distribution on cartel length where
eβ (l) = Z η
η
β (l; η) g (η) dη, l = 0, 1, 2, . . .
Of particular relevance is the frequency with which industries are cartelized:
1− eβ (0) = Z ?η
η
[1− β (0; η)] g (η) dη
=
Z ?η
η
∙
κ (1− σ)H (φ∗ (η))
1− (1− κ) (1− σ)H (φ∗ (η))
¸
g (η) dη,
and the frequency of discovered cartels:
σ
h
1− eβ (0)i = σ Z ?η
η
∙
κ (1− σ)H (φ∗ (η))
1− (1− κ) (1− σ)H (φ∗ (η))
¸
g (η) dη.
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5 Evaluating the Impact of Competition Policy
5.1 Introduction
In the firms’ problem, government policy enters through the penalty multiple, γ, and
the probability of detection and conviction, σ. Of relevance is that γ and σ repre-
sent firms’ perception of the determination of penalties (as modelled by γ) and the
probability of paying penalties (as modelled by σ). Thus, from the perspective of
the competition authority, γ and σ are latent parameters influenced by policy. For
example, the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice may increase the
amount of resources used to prosecute cartels but exactly how this will impact the
probability that firms assign to being caught and convicted is unknown. Or the Eu-
ropean Commission may alter the formula for calculating penalties, as it did with the
2006 Guidelines, but how this change translates into the perception of firms regard-
ing the determination of penalties is unclear. In fact, the "formula" for calculating
penalties involves subjective factors - such as the "seriousness of the oﬀense" - and
this leaves room for subjective beliefs.
The starting point to the exercises conducted in this section is that the competi-
tion authority makes a policy change that has an unobserved and uncertain impact
on γ or σ. Our first task is to characterize how a change in γ or σ aﬀects the rate
of cartel formation. With those results, a competition authority could deduce the
impact of a new policy if it knew what the new values were for the latent parameters
γ and σ. However, it is presumed not to have that information. We then investigate
whether the change in the cartel rate (caused by the unobserved change in γ or σ) can
be inferred by examining changes in the observable population of discovered cartels.
The questions then are: 1) what is the eﬀect of a change in a latent policy parameter
on the number of cartels?; and 2) can the eﬀect on the number of cartels be inferred
from the change in the population of discovered cartels?
5.2 Main Results
When penalties for collusion are increased, Theorem 5 reports that there are both
fewer cartels and fewer discovered cartels, as reflected in the stationary distribution.
This is not surprising since more severe penalties result in less stable cartels - as
φ∗ (η) is decreasing in γ by Theorem 3 - which means that a given industry is in
the cartelized state a smaller fraction of the time. Furthermore, by Theorem 4, bη
is decreasing in γ which means that a smaller fraction of industries are ever able to
cartelize.
Theorem 5 The rate of cartel formation, 1−eβ (0) , and the rate of discovered cartels,
σ
h
1− eβ (0)i, are decreasing in the severity of penalties, γ.
Let us now use these results to infer the impact of a new policy on the unobserved
rate of cartels by observing the rate of discovered cartels. (This exercise is straight-
forward but we go through it in preparation for a later discussion.) Suppose there
is a change in the penalty policy which, unbeknownst to the competition authority,
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results in a change in γ from γ0 to γ00. It γ00 > γ0 then the policy has intensified penal-
ties (as perceived by firms) in which case the cartel rate falls. Or the policy might
have had some perverse consequences so that γ00 < γ0 and the cartel rate rises.11 Or
perhaps the policy change is totally ineﬀective so that γ00 = γ0. This may arise if the
maximum penalty is increased but proves not to aﬀect expected penalties.
To infer the policy impact on the cartel rate from the discovered cartel rate,
consider the ratio of the new to the old steady-state discovered cartel rate:
σ
h
1− eβ (0; γ00)i
σ
h
1− eβ (0; γ0)i = 1−
eβ (0; γ00)
1− eβ (0; γ0) .
In response to a change in the penalty parameter, the percentage change in the cartel
rate equals the percentage change in the discovered cartel rate so the latter can be
used to infer the former. Thus, if there are fewer discovered cartels after the policy
change, one can infer that there are fewer cartels.
Next consider the eﬀect of a policy change that is designed to aﬀect the probability
of discovery and conviction. While a tougher enforcement policy that is eﬃcacious -
as reflected in a higher value for σ - reduces the cartel rate, its impact on the rate of
discovered cartels is ambiguous.
Theorem 6 The rate of cartel formation, 1− eβ (0) , is decreasing in σ but the eﬀect
of σ on the rate of discovered cartels, σ
h
1− eβ (0)i , is ambiguous (that is, its sign
depends on parameter values).
To understand why σ has an ambiguous eﬀect on the rate of discovered cartels,
consider raising σ from σ0 to σ00. The change in the rate of discovered cartels equals:
σ00
Z ?η(σ00)
η
£
1− β
¡
0; η, σ00
¢¤
g (η) dη − σ0
Z ?η(σ0)
η
£
1− β
¡
0; η, σ0
¢¤
g (η) dη.
This can be re-arranged so that the frequency of discovered cartels goes up if and
only if (iﬀ):Z ?η(σ00)
η
£
σ00
¡
1− β
¡
0; η, σ00
¢¢
− σ0
¡
1− β
¡
0; η, σ0
¢¢¤
g (η) dη > σ0
Z ?η(σ0)
?η(σ00)
£
1− β
¡
0; η, σ0
¢¤
g (η) dη.
(15)
The rhs term is the reduction in discovered cartels because the marginally stable
cartels no longer form (or, if they did form, they now collapse) and thus are not there
to be caught. The lhs is the change in the rate of discovered cartels among those
cartels that continue to form in spite of the higher chance of paying penalties.
Depending on σ0 and σ00, (15) could either hold or not hold so that a rise in the
probability of detection could either raise or lower the number of discovered cartels.
11Cyrenne (1999), Spagnolo (2000), Harrington (2004), and Chen and Harrington (2007) show how
antitrust policy can have the perverse eﬀect of making collusion more stable.
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If the initial probability of detection, σ0, is suﬃciently low then few cartels are being
discovered and thus an increase to σ00 means more discovered cartels. In contrast, if
σ0 is close to one then the reduced cartel rate from raising σ dominates the higher
discovery rate so that there are fewer discovered cartels (details are in the proof of
Theorem 6).
It is then problematic inferring the eﬀect of a policy change on the latent cartel
rate by measuring what has happened to the observed rate of discovered cartels. For
example, a rise in the rate of discovered cartels is consistent with both the prob-
ability of detection having increased (and thus there are fewer cartels) and having
decreased (and thus there are more cartels). However, as shown below, one can de-
rive an observable and unambiguous implication of a more eﬀective detection policy
by examining changes in the duration of discovered cartels.
The stationary distribution on cartel length, conditional on being cartelized (l ≥
1), is:
ef (l) ≡ R ?ηη β (l; η) g (η) dηR ?η
η [1− β (0; η)] g (η) dη
.
Perform the following steps:
ef (l) = Z ?η(σ)
η
⎡
⎣ β (l; η) g (η) dηR ?η(σ)
η [1− β (0; η0)] g (η0) dη0
⎤
⎦
=
Z ?η(σ)
η
µ
β (l; η, σ)
1− β (0; η, σ)
¶⎡
⎣ (1− β (0; η, σ)) g (η)R ?η(σ)
η [1− β (0; η0, σ)] g (η0) dη0
⎤
⎦ dη
=
Z ?η(σ)
η
f (l; η)
⎡
⎣ (1− β (0; η, σ)) g (η)R ?η(σ)
η [1− β (0; η0, σ)] g (η0) dη0
⎤
⎦ dη
ef (l) is then a weighted average of f (l; η) where the weight assigned to f (l; η) is the
fraction of all cartels that are of type η.
In considering the impact of raising σ from σ0 to σ00 on
nef (l)o∞
l=1
, let us break
it apart into short-run and long-run eﬀects. The short-run eﬀect on the distribution
over the duration of discovered cartels is from the immediate collapse of some cartels
upon the institution of a more aggressive detection and conviction policy. The long-
run eﬀect is the change in the distribution on duration as it converges to the new
stationary distribution. This can be made more concrete. Since bη is decreasing in σ,
cartels for which η ∈ (bη (σ00) ,bη (σ0)] are no longer stable (for any profit realizations)
after σ is raised and thereby immediately collapse. Thus, the policy change induces
an immediate shift in the mass of cartels fromZ ?η(σ0)
η
£
1− β
¡
0; η, σ0
¢¤
g (η) dη
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to Z ?η(σ00)
η
£
1− β
¡
0; η, σ0
¢¤
g (η) dη.
The distribution on discovered (and, for that matter, undiscovered) cartel duration
shifts, in the short-run, from
ef ¡l;σ0¢ ≡ Z ?η(σ0)
η
f
¡
l; η, σ0
¢⎡⎣ (1− β (0; η, σ0)) g (η)R ?η(σ0)
η [1− β (0; η0, σ0)] g (η0) dη0
⎤
⎦ dη
to
f
¡
l;σ0, σ00
¢
≡
Z ?η(σ00)
η
f
¡
l; η, σ0
¢⎡⎣ (1− β (0; η, σ0)) g (η)R ?η(σ00)
η [1− β (0; η0, σ0)] g (η0) dη0
⎤
⎦ dη.
Notice that the relative weight on f (l; η, σ0) , for η ∈ [η,bη (σ00)], is unchanged.
Theorem 7 If σ00 > σ0 then f (l;σ0, σ00) first-order stochastically dominates (FOSD)ef (l;σ0) . In other words, if a more aggressive detection and conviction policy has been
eﬀective then the duration of discovered cartels increases (in terms of FOSD) in the
short-run.
To summarize, a rise in σ causes the immediate collapse of the least stable cartels
(due to bη being decreasing in σ). This means the surviving cartels are those with lower
η and thus longer duration. Since this is the pool from which one draws discovered
cartels, the average duration of discovered cartels rises in the short-run in response
to a more aggressive detection and conviction policy.
The transition from the short-run to the (new) long-run involves the distribution
on cartel length shifting from
f
¡
l;σ0, σ00
¢
=
Z ?η(σ00)
η
f
¡
l; η, σ0
¢⎡⎣ (1− β (0; η, σ0)) g (η)R ?η(σ00)
η [1− β (0; η0, σ0)] g (η0) dη0
⎤
⎦ dη
to
ef ¡l;σ00¢ = Z ?η(σ00)
η
f
¡
l; η, σ00
¢⎡⎣ (1− β (0; η, σ00)) g (η)R ?η(σ00)
η [1− β (0; η0, σ00)] g (η0) dη0
⎤
⎦ dη.
The latter is the stationary distribution on cartel duration when σ = σ00.
Theorem 8 If σ00 > σ0 then f (l;σ0, σ00) FOSD ef (l;σ00). In other words, if a more
aggressive detection and conviction policy has been eﬀective then the duration of dis-
covered cartels decreases (in terms of FOSD) as the industry goes from the short-run
to the long-run.
In response to a policy that alters the likelihood of detection and conviction, its
eﬀect on the rate of cartels can be inferred by observing the duration of discovered
cartels in the short-run. If average cartel duration goes up (down) then the policy
has caused σ to rise (fall) and thus we can conclude that it’ll result in fewer (more)
cartels forming in the new steady-state.
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5.3 Robustness
Let us explore robustness of the result that cartel duration rises in the short-run in
response to an increase in the probability of detection. The proof of that result relies
on three steps. First, for a given competition policy, there is a cut-oﬀ bη such that
industries are capable of colluding iﬀ η ∈
£
η,bη¤ . Second, a more stringent competition
policy (specifically, a higher value for σ) causes bη to decline so that fewer industries
are capable of sustaining a cartel. Third, the expected cartel duration is decreasing
in η, which has the implication that the surviving cartels - after competition policy
is made tougher - have longer duration. The cut-oﬀ property in the first step is due
to the incremental value to colluding being decreasing in η. What is then essential is
that when η rises, both the incremental value to colluding and the expected cartel
duration decline. Thus, in response to a tougher competition policy, it is the cartels
with relatively high values for η which collapse - as the incremental value to colluding
was close enough to zero that it is now negative - and, in addition, those cartels have
relatively short duration. In discussing other sources of heterogeneity, we will then
explore the generality of the property that the incremental value to collusion and the
expected cartel duration are positively correlated.
Suppose the source of industry heterogeneity is the discount factor, δ, rather
than the gains to price undercutting, η. An industry with more patient firms will
obviously find it easier to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints associated
with collusion. This implies that cartel duration is longer for an industry with higher
δ, as it now takes a higher profit shock to destabilize the cartel. And since firms
can expect to collude for a longer time once having cartelized, the incremental value
to collusion is higher. Hence, there’ll be some threshold industry type, denoted bδ,
such that a cartel is capable of forming iﬀ δ > bδ. And when competition policy is
made tougher, bδ will rise so that cartels with relatively low values of δ will collapse
and those are also the cartels with relatively short duration. Again, we find that the
surviving cartels tend to have longer duration, which implies the average duration of
discovered cartels goes up.
Now suppose industry heterogeneity is in terms of the non-collusive solution, α.
As noted in footnote 10, the incremental value to collusion is decreasing in α; if the
non-collusive solution is less competitive, it is less valuable to collude. In Theorem 3,
it is proven that φ∗ is decreasing in α and, since a lower value for φ∗ means a higher
probability of cartel shutdown (as the cartel collapses whenever the realized profit
shock is less than φ∗), expected cartel duration is decreasing in α. Again, we find
that those industries with lower incremental value to colluding have lower expected
cartel duration.
It may be possible to construct other forms of heterogeneity whereby the incre-
mental value to collusion and expected cartel duration are not positively correlated.
For example, suppose industries diﬀer in two dimensions: the profitability of the non-
collusive outcome (which is controlled by α) and the variability of the profit shock,
which we’ll denote σ2π.12 A higher value for σ2π will tend to mean shorter cartel dura-
12This example is due to the insightful comment of a referee.
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tion since it becomes more likely there’ll be a suﬃciently high profit shock to cause
the cartel to collapse. Now suppose α and σ2π are negatively correlated so that in-
dustries which are not as competitive tend to have less variable profit shocks. It may
then be the case that industries with lower incremental value to collusion (higher α)
have higher expected cartel duration (because σ2π is lower). Hence, the more marginal
cartels that shut down in response to a tougher competition policy may actually have
higher cartel duration which means that the surviving cartels have lower duration
and thus the average duration of discovered cartels will fall in response to a tougher
competition policy. Though it does then appear there are forms of industry hetero-
geneity which could reverse the result, they are not likely to be common. And even in
this carefully constructed case, the result may not be reversed because longer average
cartel duration, in and of itself, tends to raise the incremental value to collusion.
Rather than change the source of heterogeneity, another type of change is to allow
an industry’s profit state, π, to be persistent, rather than iid, over time. Consider
the extreme case in which profit is perfectly persistent but varies across industries.13
A cartel, once formed, will persist until it is discovered because there is no internal
collapse since profit conditions do not change. It follows that the expected cartel
duration is the same for all industry types which means that cartel duration is in-
dependent of competition policy (though the frequency of cartel formation is not).
By a continuity argument, it would seem that the main result - cartel duration rises
in the short-run in response to an increase in σ - is weaker when profits are more
persistent. Nevertheless, as long as profits are not too persistent, the result should
hold though clearly the analysis would be more complex when there is the additional
state variable in the form of the current profit state.
5.4 Impact of a Corporate Leniency Program
The previous analysis explored the impact of increasing penalties or making detection
more likely. However, the most significant policy innovation in recent decades is the
institution of a corporate leniency program, which brings forth a constellation of
eﬀects; some of which deter cartel formation (by making discovery more likely) and
some of which encourage cartel formation (by waiving penalties). Here, we briefly
review some results relevant to evaluating the eﬃcacy of a leniency program. Using
numerical analysis upon an expanded version of our model, we find - consistent with
our earlier results - that a short-run rise in the average duration of discovered cartels
indicates that a leniency program is working.14
In modelling a leniency program, we have taken a standard approach in the lit-
erature (see Spagnolo, 2008). If a single cartel member applies for leniency then the
cartel is convicted for sure and the firm that applied receives a per period penalty
of θF where θ ∈ [0, 1], while the other cartel members each pay F. As before,
F = γ (Y − αμ) . Thus, a proportion 1 − θ of fines are waived for the firm that
comes forward. If all firms simultaneously apply for leniency then each firm pays a
13We thank a referee for making this insightful observation.
14Details as to the model and the numerical analysis are provided in a supplemental appendix
available from the authors.
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penalty of ωF where ω ∈ (θ, 1) . For example, if only one firm can receive leniency
and each firm has an equal probability of being first in the door then ω = n−1+θn
when there are n cartel members. It is without loss of generality that we only specify
the leniency program when either one firm applies or all firms apply. Also, leniency
is not awarded to firms that apply after another firm has done so, though the model
could easily be adapted to allow for that modification.
There are various ways in which a leniency program aﬀects the calculus to form
and maintain a cartel.15 As described in Harrington (2006), the introduction of a
leniency program can have three eﬀects and these three eﬀects are operative in our
model. First, it can make cartels less stable (that is, the maximum profit state for
cartel stability is lower) since a firm that cheats can, at the same time, apply for
leniency and thus receive a higher payoﬀ. Second, the probability of paying penalties
is higher because firms in a collapsing cartel will find it optimal to apply for leniency.
Specifically, the probability of discovery rises from σ to σH (φ∗)+(1−H (φ∗)) where
1 − H (φ∗) is the probability that a cartel collapses. Third, a leniency program
aﬀects the penalties that cartel members actually pay. When firms apply for leniency
(which occurs in equilibrium when the cartel collapses), penalties are reduced from F
to ωF . That eﬀect actually serves to promote cartel formation. The introduction of a
leniency program then has countervailing eﬀects which makes a formal investigation
worthwhile.
For all of the parameterizations of the model that we considered, a leniency pro-
gram was found to be eﬀective in reducing cartel formation.
Property 1: The introduction of a corporate leniency program reduces the long-run
frequency of cartels and raises the rate at which cartels are discovered.
Of course, the population of cartels is not observed and thus those predictions
cannot be tested directly. How the latent policy parameters θ and ω influence the
observable population of discovered cartels is summarized as Property 2. If in fact
the leniency program is aﬀecting cartel behavior as described in Property 1 then,
in the short-run, the duration of discovered cartels will rise. However, contrary to
Theorem 8, the long-run eﬀect on average observed cartel duration could go up or
down.
Property 2: In the short-run, the introduction of a corporate leniency program
raises the average duration of discovered cartels. In the long-run, the average
duration of discovered cartels can go up or down.
6 Concluding Remarks
In the last 15 years, major policy changes in the manner in which cartels are dis-
covered, prosecuted, and penalized have occurred in the European Union, United
15The ensuing discussion presumes leniency is suﬃciently great (specifically, θ < σ) so that it
would be used by a cartel member.
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States, and many other countries in the world. Though there are various intermedi-
ate measures of the impact of these policies - most notably the number of convictions,
the number of leniency applications, and the penalties imposed - the true measure
of interest is the number of cartels in existence. Success and failure of a policy is
ultimately decided by the extent to which cartels are deterred from forming. To our
knowledge, this paper is the first to develop a method for inferring the impact of
policy on the latent cartel rate using the observed population of discovered cartels.
The eﬃcacy of a policy that is intended to increase the severity of penalties can be
measured by observing the change in the number of discovered cartels as it serves as
a useful proxy for the number of cartels. That is not the case, however, with policies
that aﬀect the probability of discovery and prosecution or with the introduction of
a leniency program. Our main finding is that if these policies have, in fact, been
eﬀective in reducing the rate of cartel formation then we ought to observe a short-
run increase in the duration of discovered cartels. The duration of discovered cartels
can then provide some information as to what is happening with the underlying rate
of cartelization in the economy. Though the results are admittedly tentative in light
of the simplicity of our model, it does show that theory can shed light on the impact
of policy innovations and inject some needed substance into the policy debate.
There are many possible extensions of this framework. In markets lacking sig-
nificant entry barriers, an important constraint on collusion is the prospect of either
entry or expansion by small non-cartel members. Though the threat of entry was
not a constraint for most of the markets controlled by the vitamins cartel, it was
in the case of vitamin C where expansion by Chinese suppliers eventually disrupted
collusion. One extension of our framework is to allow for industry heterogeneity with
respect to entry barriers and then endogenize the eﬀect of cartel formation on the
number of firms. Another extension is to endogenize the probability of detection and
prosecution by assuming that the authority is constrained in how many cartels it can
discover and cases it can handle.
Currently, there is an active policy debate in many countries as to the design of
anti-cartel policies. It is absolutely vital that economists play a role in that debate
in order to ensure that sound policies are implemented and those policies that are
implemented are properly evaluated as to their impact. This is an admittedly diﬃcult
exercise but the alternative is to allow the debate to be dominated by casual and
potentially misleading measures such as the number of convictions. Indeed, one
would hope that a highly successful policy would ultimately be measured by the
absence of convictions because few cartels are forming. But then we’re always left
with distinguishing such an absence from simply an ineﬀective policy; that is, there
are still plenty of cartels, we’re just not catching and convicting them. It is the
importance of making that distinction that motivates this line of work and it is our
hope that this paper will encourage others to venture into this arena and make more
progress on this important economic and policy issue.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. Recall that
ψ (Y ) =
Z φ(Y )
π
[(1− δ)π + δY − δσ (Y −W )]h (π) dπ+
Z π
φ(Y )
[(1− δ)απ + δW ]h (π) dπ−δσF
where
φ (Y ) =
δ (1− σ) (1− κ) (Y − αμ)
[1− δ (1− κ)] (η − 1) ,W =
(1− κ) (1− δ)αμ+ κY
1− δ (1− κ) , F = γ (Y − αμ) .
Since Y ≥W, then
ψ (μ) ≤
Z φ(μ)
π
[(1− δ)π + δμ]h (π) dπ +
Z π
φ(μ)
[(1− δ)απ + δμ]h (π) dπ − δσF ⇔
ψ (μ) ≤ μ−
Z π
φ(μ)
(1− δ) (1− α)πh (π) dπ − δσF,
and, therefore, ψ (μ) < μ. Given that ψ (αμ) = αμ, it follows that ψ maps [αμ, μ]
into itself as long as ψ0 (Y ) ≥ 0,∀Y . We’ll now show that property holds.
If φ (Y ) < π then
ψ (Y ) =
Z π
π
[(1− δ)απ + δW ]h (π) dπ − δσF
and thus
ψ0 (Y ) =
Z π
π
δ
∂W
∂Y
h (π) dπ =
δκ
1− δ (1− κ) > 0.
If π < φ (Y ) then
ψ (Y ) =
Z π
π
[(1− δ)π + δY − δσ (Y −W )]h (π) dπ − δσγ (Y − αμ) ,
and thus
ψ0 (Y ) = δ
∙
1− σ
µ
1− ∂W
∂Y
¶
− σ∂F
∂Y
¸
= δ
∙
(1− σ)
µ
1− ∂W
∂Y
¶
+
∂W
∂Y
− σγ
¸
,
which is positive since ∂W/∂Y = κ1−δ(1−κ) ∈ (0, 1) and it is assumed
κ
1−δ(1−κ) > σγ.
If we now suppose φ (Y ) ∈ (π, π) , then
ψ0 (Y ) = [(1− δ)φ (Y ) + δY − δσ (Y −W )]h (φ (Y ))φ0 (Y ) +
Z φ(Y )
π
δ
∙
1− σ
µ
1− ∂W
∂Y
¶¸
h (π) dπ
− [(1− δ)αφ (Y ) + δW ]h (φ (Y ))φ0 (Y ) +
Z π
φ(Y )
δ
∂W
∂Y
h (π) dπ − δσ∂F
∂Y
= [(1− δ) (1− α)φ (Y ) + δ (1− σ) (Y −W )]h (φ (Y ))φ0 (Y )
+
Z φ(Y )
π
δ (1− σ)
µ
1− ∂W
∂Y
¶
h (π) dπ + δ
µ
∂W
∂Y
− σ∂F
∂Y
¶
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which is positive since ∂W/∂Y ∈ (0, 1) and
∂W
∂Y
− σ∂F
∂Y
=
κ
1− δ (1− κ) − σγ > 0.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let us first prove that a collusive solution exists for η close
to 1. First note that if Y − αμ > 0 then
lim
η→1
δ (1− σ) (1− κ) (Y − αμ)
[1− δ (1− κ)] (η − 1) = +∞.
Hence, limη→1 φ (Y, η) > π which implies:
lim
η→1
ψ (Y ) =
Z π
π
∙
(1− δ)π + δY −
µ
δσ (1− κ) (1− δ) (Y − αμ)
1− δ (1− κ)
¶¸
h (π) dπ−δσγ (Y − αμ) .
Next note:
lim
σ→0
lim
η→1
ψ (Y ) =
Z π
π
[(1− δ)π + δY ]h (π) dπ,
where the order of limits doesn’t matter. Since (1− δ)μ+ δY > Y iﬀ Y < μ then:
if Y ∈ (αμ, μ) then limσ→0 limη→1 ψ (Y ) > Y. Thus, if Y < μ then ψ (Y ) > Y for η
suﬃciently close to one and σ suﬃciently close to zero. By continuity, ∃Y ∈ (αμ, μ]
such that ψ (Y ) = Y.We then have: If σ is suﬃciently close to zero then ∃bη > 1 such
that Y ∗ (η) ∈ (αμ, μ] ∀η ∈ (1,bη] .
The next step is to prove that a collusive solution does not exist for large enough
η. We want to show that
ψ (Y ) < Y ∀Y > αμ
when η → +∞. The ICC is:
(1− δ)π + δ (1− σ)Y + δσ (W − F ) ≥ (1− δ) ηπ + δW − δσF ⇔
δ (1− σ) (Y −W ) ≥ (1− δ) (η − 1)π (16)
which is decreasing in π and W and increasing in Y. Since π ≥ π (> 0) , W ≥ αμ,
and Y ≤ μ then a suﬃcient condition for (16) not to hold ∀π is:
δ (1− σ) (1− α)μ < (1− δ) (η − 1)π ⇔
(1− δ)π + δ (1− σ) (1− α)μ
(1− δ)π < η.
Thus, ∃η0 such that a cartel never forms when η > η0.
To sum, ∃bη > 1 such that Y ∗ (η) ∈ (αμ, μ] ∀η ∈ (1,bη] and ∃η0 > bη such that
ψ (Y ; η0) < Y ∀Y > αμ ∀η > η0 and thus Y ∗ (η) = αμ ∀η > η0. It is shown in the proof
of Theorem 3 that ψ (Y ) is decreasing in η. Hence, if ψ (Y ; η00) < Y ∀Y > αμ then
ψ (Y ; η) < Y ∀Y > αμ ∀η > η00. We conclude that ∃bη > 1 such that Y ∗ (η) ∈ (αμ, μ]
∀η ∈ (1,bη] and Y ∗ (η0) = αμ ∀η > bη.
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Proof of Theorem 3. If Y ∗ (η) ∈ {αμ, μ} then the maximal fixed point is a
corner solution in which case, generically, marginal changes in parameters do not
aﬀect Y ∗ (η) . For the remainder of the proof suppose Y ∗ (η) ∈ (αμ, μ) and further
suppose, initially, that φ ∈ (π, π) .
To explore the eﬀect of σ on Y ∗ (η) , consider:
∂ψ (Y )
∂σ
= [(1− δ)φ+ δY − δσ (Y −W )]h (φ) ∂φ
∂σ
−
Z φ
π
δ (Y −W )h (π) dπ − [(1− δ)αφ+ δW ]h (φ) ∂φ
∂σ
− δF
= [(1− δ) (1− α)φ+ δ (1− σ) (Y −W )]h (φ) ∂φ
∂σ
−
Z φ
π
δ (Y −W )h (π) dπ − δF,
which is negative since
∂φ
∂σ
=
−δ (1− κ) (Y − αμ)
[1− δ (1− κ)] (η − 1) < 0.
Now consider increasing σ from σ0 to σ00. Given that ∂ψ (Y ) /∂σ < 0, ψ (Y ) shifts
down. Since ψ (Y, σ0) ≤ Y as Y ≥ Y ∗ (σ0) then ψ (Y, σ00) < Y ∀Y ≥ Y ∗ (σ0) which
implies Y ∗ (σ00) < Y ∗ (σ0) . The other comparative statics on Y ∗ will also use this
method of showing how a change in a parameter aﬀects ψ (Y ) .
Next consider changing γ. Since
∂ψ (Y )
∂γ
= −δσ (Y − αμ) < 0,
then ψ (Y ) is also decreasing in γ which implies Y ∗ is decreasing in γ.
If instead φ = π then Y ∗ (η) = αμ and thus Y ∗ (η) is, generically, independent of
σ and γ. If φ = π then
ψ (Y ) =
Z π
π
[(1− δ)π + δY − δσ (Y −W )]h (π) dπ − δσF
=
Z π
π
∙
(1− δ)π + δY − δσ (1− κ) (1− δ) (Y − αμ)
1− δ (1− κ)
¸
h (π) dπ − δσγ (Y − αμ) ,
which is decreasing in σ and γ and, therefore, Y ∗ is decreasing in σ and γ.
Now consider the impact of changing η. Note that η only operates through φ
since, in equilibrium, a firm never cheats. Hence, Y ∗ (η) is independent of η when
φ /∈ (π, π) . Let us then suppose φ ∈ (π, π) in which case:
∂ψ (Y )
∂η
= [(1− δ)φ+ δY − δσ (Y −W )]h (φ) ∂φ
∂η
− [(1− δ)αφ+ δW ]h (φ) ∂φ
∂η
= [(1− δ) (1− α)φ+ δ (1− σ) (Y −W )]h (φ) ∂φ
∂η
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which is negative since
∂φ
∂η
= −δ (1− σ) (1− κ) (Y − αμ)
[1− δ (1− κ)] (η − 1)2
.
Hence, raising η lowers ψ (Y ) and thus lowers Y ∗.
Turning to comparative statics for φ∗, first note that if φ∗ > π then Y ∗ > αμ and
φ∗ =
δ (1− σ) (1− κ) (Y ∗ − αμ)
[1− δ (1− κ)] (η − 1)
Consider σ00 > σ0 :
φ∗
¡
σ00
¢
− φ∗
¡
σ0
¢
=
δ (1− σ00) (1− κ) (Y ∗ (σ00)− αμ)
[1− δ (1− κ)] (η − 1) −
δ (1− σ0) (1− κ) (Y ∗ (σ0)− αμ)
[1− δ (1− κ)] (η − 1)
=
µ
δ (1− κ)
[1− δ (1− κ)] (η − 1)
¶
[
¡
1− σ00
¢ ¡
Y ∗
¡
σ00
¢
− αμ
¢
−
¡
1− σ0
¢ ¡
Y ∗
¡
σ0
¢
− αμ
¢
],
which is negative. Thus, φ∗ (σ) is decreasing in σ.
Consider γ00 > γ0 :
φ∗
¡
γ00
¢
− φ∗
¡
γ0
¢
=
δ (1− σ) (1− κ) (Y ∗ (γ00)− αμ)
[1− δ (1− κ)] (η − 1) −
δ (1− σ0) (1− κ) (Y ∗ (γ0)− αμ)
[1− δ (1− κ)] (η − 1)
=
µ
δ (1− σ) (1− κ)
[1− δ (1− κ)] (η − 1)
¶£
Y ∗
¡
γ00
¢
− Y ∗
¡
γ0
¢¤
< 0,
since, by Theorem 3, Y ∗ is decreasing in γ.
Consider η00 > η0 :
φ∗
¡
η00
¢
− φ∗
¡
η0
¢
=
δ (1− σ) (1− κ) (Y ∗ (η00)− αμ)
[1− δ (1− κ)] (η00 − 1) −
δ (1− σ0) (1− κ) (Y ∗ (η0)− αμ)
[1− δ (1− κ)] (η0 − 1)
=
µ
δ (1− σ) (1− κ)
[1− δ (1− κ)]
¶ ∙µ
Y ∗ (η00)− αμ
η00 − 1
¶
−
µ
Y ∗ (η0)− αμ
η0 − 1
¶¸
< 0.
since Y ∗ is decreasing in η (by Theorem 3), Y ∗ (η0) − αμ > Y ∗ (η00) − αμ > 0, and
η00 − 1 > η0 − 1.
Finally, let us show that φ∗ is decreasing in α when φ∗ ∈ (π, π) . Recall that a
fixed point is defined by:
Y =
Z δ(1−σ)(1−κ)(Y−αμ)
[1−δ(1−κ)](η−1)
π
∙
(1− δ)π + δY −
µ
δσ (1− κ) (1− δ) (Y − αμ)
1− δ (1− κ)
¶¸
h (π) dπ
+
Z π
δ(1−σ)(1−κ)(Y−αμ)
[1−δ(1−κ)](η−1)
∙
(1− δ)απ + δ
µ
(1− κ) (1− δ)αμ+ κY
1− δ (1− κ)
¶¸
h (π) dπ − δσγ (Y − αμ) .
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Subtract αμ from both sides and define ∆ ≡ Y − αμ so that we now are looking for
a fixed point in ∆ :
∆ = Φ (∆, α) ≡
Z δ(1−σ)(1−κ)∆
[1−δ(1−κ)](η−1)
π
∙
(1− δ)π + δ∆+ δαμ−
µ
δσ (1− κ) (1− δ)∆
1− δ (1− κ)
¶¸
h (π) dπ
+
Z π
δ(1−σ)(1−κ)∆
[1−δ(1−κ)](η−1)
∙
(1− δ)απ + δ
µ
(1− κ) (1− δ)αμ+ κ∆
1− δ (1− κ)
¶
+
δκαμ
1− δ (1− κ)
¸
h (π) dπ
−δσγ∆− αμ
=
Z δ(1−σ)(1−κ)∆
[1−δ(1−κ)](η−1)
π
∙
(1− δ)π + δ∆−
µ
δσ (1− κ) (1− δ)∆
1− δ (1− κ)
¶¸
h (π) dπ
+
Z δ(1−σ)(1−κ)∆
[1−δ(1−κ)](η−1)
π
δαμh (π) dπ +
Z π
δ(1−σ)(1−κ)∆
[1−δ(1−κ)](η−1)
µ
δκαμ
1− δ (1− κ)
¶
h (π) dπ
+
Z π
δ(1−σ)(1−κ)∆
[1−δ(1−κ)](η−1)
∙
(1− δ)απ + δ
µ
(1− κ) (1− δ)αμ+ κ∆
1− δ (1− κ)
¶¸
h (π) dπ − δσγ∆− αμ.
Let Φ : [0, μ]→ [0, μ].
Let α = α0 and suppose φ∗ (η;α0) ∈ (π, π) which implies the maximal fixed point,
∆∗ (α0) , is interior and thus:
Φ
¡
∆, α0
¢
5 0 as ∆ = ∆∗
¡
α0
¢
.
If we then show that Φ (∆, α) is decreasing in α, it follows that if α00 > α0 then
Φ
¡
∆, α00
¢
< 0 ∀ ∆ = ∆∗
¡
α0
¢
,
and therefore
∆∗
¡
α00
¢
< ∆∗
¡
α0
¢
.
If φ∗ (η;α0) ∈ (π, π) then:
∂Φ (∆, α)
∂α
=
Z φ
π
δμh (π) dπ +
Z π
φ
µ
δκμ
1− δ (1− κ)
¶
h (π) dπ
+
Z π
φ
∙
(1− δ)π + δ
µ
(1− κ) (1− δ)μ
1− δ (1− κ)
¶¸
h (π) dπ − μ
= −
Z φ
π
(1− δ)πh (π) dπ < 0.
We conclude that if φ∗ (η;α0) ∈ (π, π) then ∆∗ (α0) is (locally) decreasing in α.
Next note that:
φ∗ (η;α) =
δ (1− σ) (1− κ) [Y ∗ (η;α)− αμ]
[1− δ (1− κ)] (η − 1) =
δ (1− σ) (1− κ)∆∗ (α)
[1− δ (1− κ)] (η − 1) .
Hence, φ∗ (η;α) is decreasing in α because ∆∗ (α) is decreasing in α.
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Proof of Theorem 4. Recall that bη satisfies the property:
Y ∗ (η)
½
> αμ if η ∈
£
η,bη¤
= αμ if η > bη
By the continuity of ψ (Y, η) with respect to Y and η and that ψ (Y, η) is decreasing
in η (when Y ∗ (η) > αμ), it follows that:
ψ (Y,bη) ≤ Y,∀Y and ψ (Y ∗ (bη) ,bη) = Y ∗ (bη) .
With this property, let us now argue that bη is decreasing in σ and γ.
Consider raising σ from σ0 to σ00. Since ψ (Y, η) is decreasing in σ for Y > αμ
then
ψ
¡
Y,bη ¡σ0¢ , σ00¢ < Y, ∀Y > αμ,
follows from ψ (Y,bη (σ0) , σ0) ≤ Y, ∀Y. Given that ψ (Y, η) is decreasing in η for Y > αμ
then bη (σ00) < bη (σ0) . A similar argument applies to changes in γ.
To show that bη is decreasing in α, recall from the definition of bη (α) that:
Φ (∆,bη (α) , α) ≤ ∆ ∀∆.
Since Φ (∆,bη (α) , α) is decreasing in α (holding bη fixed) then: if α00 > α0 then
Φ
¡
∆,bη ¡α0¢ , α00¢ < ∆ ∀∆ > 0.
This implies bη (α00) < bη (α0) if Φ (∆,bη (α0) , α00) is decreasing in η. Since Φ (∆, η, α) =
ψ (Y, η, α) − αμ and we’ve already shown that ψ (Y, η, α) is decreasing in η then
Φ (∆, η, α) is decreasing in η.
Proof of Theorem 5. Let us first consider the impact of γ on the stationary rate
of cartels for a type-η sub-population. Suppose that penalties are made more severe
as reflected in γ being increased from γ0 to γ00. As the cartel rate is
κ (1− σ)H (φ∗ (γ, η))
1− (1− κ) (1− σ)H (φ∗ (γ, η))
then the change in the cartel rate is
κ (1− σ)H (φ∗ (γ00, η))
1− (1− κ) (1− σ)H (φ∗ (γ00, η)) −
κ (1− σ)H (φ∗ (γ0, η))
1− (1− κ) (1− σ)H (φ∗ (γ0, η)) .
Next note that
sign
½
κ (1− σ)H (φ∗ (γ00, η))
1− (1− κ) (1− σ)H (φ∗ (γ00, η)) −
κ (1− σ)H (φ∗ (γ0, η))
1− (1− κ) (1− σ)H (φ∗ (γ0, η))
¾
= sign
©
κ (1− σ)
£
H
¡
φ∗
¡
γ00, η
¢¢
−H
¡
φ∗
¡
γ0, η
¢¢¤ª
< 0,
as φ∗ (γ00) < φ∗ (γ0) by Theorem 3.
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It is then straightforward to extend this to the entire population of cartels. Recall
that the cartel rate isZ ?η(γ)
η
∙
κ (1− σ)H (φ∗ (γ, η))
1− (1− κ) (1− σ)H (φ∗ (γ, η))
¸
g (η) dη
after integrating over all type-η industries. It has just been shown that the integrand
is decreasing in γ and since bη (γ) is decreasing in γ by Theorem 4 then this expression
is decreasing in γ. Since the rate of discovered cartels is proportional to the rate of
cartels then the discovered cartel rate is also decreasing in γ.
Proof of Theorem 6. Suppose conviction is made more likely so that σ is raised
from σ0 to σ00. Using (13), the change in the rate of cartels is:
κ (1− σ00)H (φ∗ (σ00, η))
1− (1− κ) (1− σ00)H (φ∗ (σ00, η)) −
κ (1− σ0)H (φ∗ (σ0, η))
1− (1− κ) (1− σ0)H (φ∗ (σ0, η)) .
The sign of that expression is the same as:
sign
©
κ
¡
1− σ00
¢
H
¡
φ∗
¡
σ00, η
¢¢ £
1− (1− κ)
¡
1− σ0
¢
H
¡
φ∗
¡
σ0, η
¢¢¤
−
κ
¡
1− σ0
¢
H
¡
φ∗
¡
σ0, η
¢¢ £
1− (1− κ)
¡
1− σ00
¢
H
¡
φ∗
¡
σ00, η
¢¢¤ª
= sign
©¡
1− σ00
¢
H
¡
φ∗
¡
σ00, η
¢¢
−
¡
1− σ0
¢
H
¡
φ∗
¡
σ0, η
¢¢ª
< 0.
This expression is negative because σ00 > σ0 implies 1−σ00 < 1−σ0 andH (φ∗ (σ00, η)) <
H (φ∗ (σ0, η)), since φ∗ (σ00, η) < φ∗ (σ0, η) by Theorem 3.
It is then straightforward to extend this to the entire population of cartels. Recall
that the cartel rate isZ ?η(σ)
η
∙
κ (1− σ)H (φ∗ (σ, η))
1− (1− κ) (1− σ)H (φ∗ (σ, η))
¸
dG (η)
after integrating over all type-η industries. It has just been shown that the integrand
is decreasing in σ and since bη (σ) is decreasing in σ by Theorem 4 then this expression
is decreasing in σ.
To show that the rate of discovered cartels can be either increasing or decreasing
in σ, let us fix σ00 (> 0) and make the initial probability of conviction suﬃciently
small (σ0 ' 0). As σ0 → 0, (15) holds because the rhs goes to zero and the lhs is
bounded above zero. Not surprisingly, the frequency of discovered cartels rises when
the probability of conviction is raised from an initial level close to zero. Now suppose
instead σ0 is suﬃciently small so that some cartels form; that is, bη (σ0) > η. Consider
what happens when σ00 goes to one. Recall
ψ (Y ) =
Z δ(1−σ)(1−κ)(Y−αμ)
[1−δ(1−κ)](η−1)
π
∙
(1− δ)π + δY −
µ
δσ (1− κ) (1− δ) (Y − αμ)
1− δ (1− κ)
¶¸
h (π) dπ
+
Z π
δ(1−σ)(1−κ)(Y−αμ)
[1−δ(1−κ)](η−1)
∙
(1− δ)απ + δ
µ
(1− κ) (1− δ)αμ+ κY
1− δ (1− κ)
¶¸
h (π) dπ − δσγ (Y − αμ) .
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For Y − αμ > 0,
lim
σ→1
δ (1− σ) (1− κ) (Y − αμ)
[1− δ (1− κ)] (η − 1) = 0
which implies
lim
σ→1
ψ (Y ) =
Z π
π
∙
(1− δ)απ + δ
µ
(1− κ) (1− δ)αμ+ κY
1− δ (1− κ)
¶¸
h (π) dπ − δγ (Y − αμ)
= (1− δ)αμ+ δ
µ
(1− κ) (1− δ)αμ+ κY
1− δ (1− κ)
¶
− δγ (Y − αμ) .
If γ = 0 then
lim
σ→1
ψ (Y ) = (1− δ)αμ+ δ
µ
(1− κ) (1− δ)αμ+ κY
1− δ (1− κ)
¶
=
(1− δ)αμ+ δκY
1− δ (1− κ) ∈ (αμ, Y ) .
Since ψ (Y ) is decreasing in γ then: if Y > αμ then limσ→1 ψ (Y ) < Y. This implies
Y ∗ (η) = αμ ∀η > 1 as σ → 1. Hence, limσ→1 bη (σ) = 1 so the cartel rate is zero when
σ00 is suﬃciently close to one. Since β (0; η, σ00) = 1 ∀η > 1, (15) does not hold since
the rhs is positive and the lhs is zero.
To prove Theorem 7, the next lemma will be useful. It shows for a type-η sub-
population that a fall in σ (and γ) cause a first-order stochastic dominance shift in
the distribution over the length of cartels and discovered cartels.
Lemma 9 A decrease in σ or γ causes a first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD)
shift in the stationary type-η distribution on the duration of cartels and the duration
of discovered cartels.
Proof of Lemma. Suppose σ is raised from σ0 to σ00 and consider the impact of
the proportion of cartels of length l.
f (l; η, σ00)
f (l; η, σ0)
=
H (φ∗ (σ00))l−1 (1− σ00)l−1 [1−H (φ∗ (σ00)) (1− σ00)]
H (φ∗ (σ0))l−1 (1− σ0)l−1 [1−H (φ∗ (σ0)) (1− σ0)]
=
µ
H (φ∗ (σ00)) (1− σ00)
H (φ∗ (σ0)) (1− σ0)
¶l−1µ1−H (φ∗ (σ00)) (1− σ00)
1−H (φ∗ (σ0)) (1− σ0)
¶
.
A more aggressive competition policy makes a duration of one period more likely:
f (1; η, σ00)
f (1; η, σ0)
=
µ
1−H (φ∗ (σ00)) (1− σ00)
1−H (φ∗ (σ0)) (1− σ0)
¶
> 1⇒ f
¡
1; η, σ00
¢
> f
¡
1; η, σ0
¢
.
Perform the following steps:
f (l; η, σ00)
f (l; η, σ0)
=
µ
H (φ∗ (σ00)) (1− σ00)
H (φ∗ (σ0)) (1− σ0)
¶l−1µ1−H (φ∗ (σ00)) (1− σ00)
1−H (φ∗ (σ0)) (1− σ0)
¶
ln
µ
f (l; η, σ00)
f (l; η, σ0)
¶
= (l − 1) ln
µ
H (φ∗ (σ00)) (1− σ00)
H (φ∗ (σ0)) (1− σ0)
¶
+ ln
µ
1−H (φ∗ (σ00)) (1− σ00)
1−H (φ∗ (σ0)) (1− σ0)
¶
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Since
∂ ln
³
f(l;η,σ00)
f(l;η,σ0)
´
∂l
= ln
µ
H (φ∗ (σ00)) (1− σ00)
H (φ∗ (σ0)) (1− σ0)
¶
< 0
and
∂ ln
³
f(l;η,σ00)
f(l;η,σ0)
´
∂l
=
∂(f(l;η,σ00)/f(l;η,σ0))
∂l
f (l; η, σ00) /f (l; η, σ0)
then
∂
³
f(l;η,σ00)
f(l;η,σ0)
´
∂l
< 0.
To summarize, f(l;η,σ
00)
f(l;η,σ0) > 1 at l = 1 and
f(l;η,σ00)
f(l;η,σ0) is decreasing in l. Since
P∞
l=1 f (l; η, σ) =
1 then it cannot be the case that f(l;η,σ
00)
f(l;η,σ0) > 1 for some l and
f(l;η,σ00)
f(l;η,σ0) ≥ 1 ∀l. It follows
that, generically,
∃l∗ ≥ 1 such that f
¡
l; η, σ00
¢
> (<) f
¡
l; η, σ0
¢
as l ≥ (<) l∗.
f (l; η, σ0) then first-order stochastically dominates (FOSD) f (l; η, σ00) .
A similar argument shows that lower penalties - as reflected in reducing γ from
γ00 to γ0 - results in a FOSD shift of the distribution of cartel duration.
f (l; η, γ00)
f (l; η, γ0)
=
µ
H (φ∗ (γ00)) (1− σ)
H (φ∗ (γ0)) (1− σ)
¶l−1µ1−H (φ∗ (γ00)) (1− σ)
1−H (φ∗ (γ0)) (1− σ)
¶
=
µ
H (φ∗ (γ00))
H (φ∗ (γ0))
¶l−1µ1−H (φ∗ (γ00)) (1− σ)
1−H (φ∗ (γ0)) (1− σ)
¶
.
f (1; η, γ00)
f (1; η, γ0)
=
µ
1−H (φ∗ (γ00)) (1− σ)
1−H (φ∗ (γ0)) (1− σ)
¶
> 1⇒ f
¡
1; η, γ00
¢
> f
¡
1; η, γ0
¢
.
sign
⎧
⎨
⎩
∂
³
f(l;η,σ00)
f(l;η,σ0)
´
∂l
⎫
⎬
⎭ = sign
½
H (φ∗ (γ00))
H (φ∗ (γ0))
¾
< 0.
Hence,
∃l∗ ≥ 1 such that f
¡
l; η, γ00
¢
> (<) f
¡
l; η, γ0
¢
as l ≥ (<) l∗,
and, therefore, f (l; η, γ0) FOSD f (l; η, γ00) .
Proof of Theorem 7. We want to show that f (l;σ0, σ00) FOSD ef (l;σ0) . That is,
for any l0,
l0X
l=1
Z ?η(σ00)
η
f
¡
l; η, σ0
¢⎡⎣ (1− β (0; η, σ0)) g (η)R ?η(σ00)
η [1− β (0; η0, σ0)] g (η0) dη0
⎤
⎦ dη (17)
<
l0X
l=1
Z ?η(σ0)
η
f
¡
l; η, σ0
¢⎡⎣ (1− β (0; η, σ0)) g (η)R ?η(σ0)
η [1− β (0; η0, σ0)] g (η0) dη0
⎤
⎦ dη
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Note that the term on the right of the inequality can be expressed as below.
⎛
⎝
R ?η(σ00)
η [1− β (0; η0, σ0)] g (η0) dη0R ?η(σ0)
η [1− β (0; η0, σ0)] g (η0) dη0
⎞
⎠× (18)
l0X
l=1
Z ?η(σ00)
η
f
¡
l; η, σ0
¢⎡⎣ (1− β (0; η, σ0)) g (η)R ?η(σ00)
η [1− β (0; η0, σ0)] g (η0) dη0
⎤
⎦ dη
+
⎛
⎝
R ?η(σ0)
η [1− β (0; η0, σ0)] g (η0) dη0 −
R ?η(σ00)
η [1− β (0; η0, σ0)] g (η0) dη0R ?η(σ0)
η [1− β (0; η0, σ0)] g (η0) dη0
⎞
⎠×
l0X
l=1
Z ?η(σ0)
?η(σ00)
f
¡
l; η, σ0
¢×
⎡
⎣ (1− β (0; η, σ
0)) g (η)R ?η(σ0)
η [1− β (0; η0, σ0)] g (η0) dη0 −
R ?η(σ00)
η [1− β (0; η0, σ0)] g (η0) dη0
⎤
⎦ dη
What we’ve done is to break apart the integration into
R ?η(σ00)
η and
R ?η(σ0)
?η(σ00) and then
multiplied the first term byR ?η(σ00)
η [1− β (0; η0, σ0)] g (η0) dη0R ?η(σ00)
η [1− β (0; η0, σ0)] g (η0) dη0
and the second term byR ?η(σ0)
η [1− β (0; η0, σ0)] g (η0) dη0 −
R ?η(σ00)
η [1− β (0; η0, σ0)] g (η0) dη0R ?η(σ0)
η [1− β (0; η0, σ0)] g (η0) dη0 −
R ?η(σ00)
η [1− β (0; η0, σ0)] g (η0) dη0
.
Substitute (18) into (17), we then need to show:
l0X
l=1
Z ?η(σ00)
η
f
¡
l; η, σ0
¢⎡⎣ (1− β (0; η, σ0)) g (η)R ?η(σ00)
η [1− β (0; η0)] g (η0) dη0
⎤
⎦ dη (19)
< υ
l0X
l=1
Z ?η(σ00)
η
f
¡
l; η, σ0
¢⎡⎣ (1− β (0; η, σ0)) g (η)R ?η(σ00)
η [1− β (0; η0, σ0)] g (η0) dη0
⎤
⎦ dη
+(1− υ)
l0X
l=1
Z ?η(σ0)
?η(σ00)
f
¡
l; η, σ0
¢×
⎡
⎣ (1− β (0; η, σ
0)) g (η)R ?η(σ0)
η [1− β (0; η0, σ0)] g (η0) dη0 −
R ?η(σ00)
η [1− β (0; η0, σ0)] g (η0) dη0
⎤
⎦ dη
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where
υ ≡
R ?η(σ00)
η [1− β (0; η0, σ0)] g (η0) dη0R ?η(σ0)
η [1− β (0; η0, σ0)] g (η0) dη0
.
Manipulating (19),
(1− υ)
l0X
l=1
Z ?η(σ00)
η
f
¡
l; η, σ0
¢⎡⎣ (1− β (0; η, σ0)) g (η)R ?η(σ00)
η [1− β (0; η0)] g (η0) dη0
⎤
⎦ dη
< (1− υ)
l0X
l=1
Z ?η(σ0)
?η(σ00)
f
¡
l; η, σ0
¢×
⎡
⎣ (1− β (0; η, σ
0)) g (η)R ?η(σ0)
η [1− β (0; η0, σ0)] g (η0) dη0 −
R ?η(σ00)
η [1− β (0; η0, σ0)] g (η0) dη0
⎤
⎦ dη ⇔
l0X
l=1
Z ?η(σ00)
η
f
¡
l; η, σ0
¢⎡⎣ (1− β (0; η, σ0)) g (η)R ?η(σ00)
η [1− β (0; η0)] g (η0) dη0
⎤
⎦ dη (20)
<
l0X
l=1
Z ?η(σ0)
?η(σ00)
f
¡
l; η, σ0
¢×
⎡
⎣ (1− β (0; η, σ
0)) g (η)R ?η(σ0)
η [1− β (0; η0, σ0)] g (η0) dη0 −
R ?η(σ00)
η [1− β (0; η0, σ0)] g (η0) dη0
⎤
⎦ dη
Recall that if η00 > η0 then f (l; η0, σ) FOSD f (l; η00, σ) (Lemma 10). Hence, except
for η = bη (σ00) ,
f
¡
l; η0, σ0
¢
< f
¡
l; η00, σ0
¢
, ∀η0 ∈ η ∈
£
η,bη ¡σ00¢¤ ,∀η00 ∈ η £bη ¡σ00¢ ,bη ¡σ0¢¤ .
It follows that (20) holds.
Proof of Theorem 8. Since f (l; η, σ0) FOSD f (l; η, σ00) ∀η ∈
£
η,bη (σ00)¤ (by
Lemma 10) then the short-run distribution on cartel duration FOSD the long-run
distribution.
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